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Toward a Fusion of Theological Horizons: 
Constructivist Reflections and Responses to 
the Question of Theism in the Yoga Sūtra 
 
Graham M. Schweig 
Christopher Newport University 
 
IT is important to explore and disclose 
how--perhaps even why--we are going to 
speak about Christian and Yogic theism 
before conducting an exploration on 
theism in comparative relation between 
the two traditions. In this kind of 
discussion, it is inevitable that working 
definitions of key terms be provided, 
particular terms that will be clarified and 
offered to facilitate the discussion. In this 
study, I examine and draw from the 
particular studies of three scholars in the 
field who address the relationship between 
Christianity and Yoga in order to illuminate 
the dialectical tension between a resistence 
toward and the persistence of the 
development of a yogic theism. I will argue 
that Yoga as explicated in the Yoga Sūtra 
possesses a strong and natural theological 
character, containing a distinct, open-
ended raw theism that necessitates the 
expansion of the domain and definition of 
the term. 
What must be stated at the outset is 
that my discussion here is specifically 
theological, but not in the sense that is 
commonly understood. This exploration of 
theism is speaking not merely from within 
a particular tradition for that particular 
faith community. Such a person who speaks 
theology from within a tradition primarily 
for the benefit of the believers is commonly 
known as a theologian. But here, this 
discussion is conducted as a constructivist 
exercise within comparative theology, with 
a motive to further an understanding of 
shared theological moments and 
connections between traditions, and 
additionally, to explore the possibility of 
some greater disclosure of religious truths 
that might bring theology more into the 
world of sound intellectual discourse. I 
would suggest, then, a distinction be made 
between a theologian and a theologist. The 
latter, I propose, should point to that 
person doing theology not only from 
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within a particular tradition but between 
traditions or even from outside of any 
tradition: he or she would be known as a 
theologist. Here the extra-religious realm 
of theology is engaged to nourish the 
deeper dimensions of specific traditions, 
and further, to serve in some small way a 
global community that still thirsts for a 
vision of world peace and ultimate meaning.  
In her study, T. S. Rukmani sets the 
stage for understanding ancient Indian 
theism. Rukmani asserts that ancient Vedic 
and Upanishadic thought expresses how 
“everything in the univese” is a form of 
Brahman, and that it is “possible to 
meditate or be devoted to a concept of the 
highest Truth or Īśvara in the Vedic 
tradition.” She warns her reader that it 
may be difficult for persons coming from 
within the abrahamic faiths to understand 
ancient India’s form of abstract theism.  
Truly, in ancient India there is a fluid 
movement between an abstract, 
nondescriptive and nonpersonal theism 
(often refered to as nirguṇa, or the absolute 
“without qualities”) and the less abstract 
and more naturalistic, more descriptive 
and personal theism (saguṇa, or the 
absolute “with qualities”). But here theism 
is preoccupied not so much with the 
designation of either the one or the other, 
or even the identity of the theos. Rather it is 
the relationship of the theos to and within 
the ultimate reality, or the Brahman, which 
encompasses all. Hindu India may frustrate 
the philosopher of religion since it is not 
strictly a black-and-white distinction. It is 
not a question of whether or not Brahman 
is theistic or not, because it is certainly 
both at the same time. The theistic and 
nontheistic attributes are fluid rather than 
rigidly static. And though later sectarian 
Hindu traditions may argue which one is 
“higher,” or which one arises from the 
other, or which one is more ultimate, 
theologically speaking, to do so may eclipse 
or undercut the divine fullness of Brahman 
in the process.    
Thus Rukmani essentially prepares her 
Christian or more generally Western reader 
for encountering a theism that is quite 
different than those arising from the 
biblical tradition. Abrahamic theisms 
consider the identity and personalism of 
the theos of paramount importance, a 
conception that by comparison to the 
Indian theism leans heavily toward a 
deistic position. In India, we have the 
interplay between the pantheistic, as it 
were, and the deistic conceptions, such that 
the nondescriptive, nonpersonal and the 
descriptive, personal dimensions of the 
absolute reality are not only inseparable, 
but they are necessarily intertwined. This 
kind of vision requires specifically a 
theological, and not so much a 
philosophical, understanding therefore.  
In her study entitled “Vijñānabhikṣu’s 
Approach to the Īśvara Concept in 
Patañjali’s Yogasūtras,” Rukmani offers the 
very well-known statement in the Rig Veda 
(which too often is translated imprecisely) 
to further describe the unusual and 
different character of Indian theism. Her 
translation of the passage is as follows: 
“Truth is One. It can be described 
variously.” She cites this passage to 
illustrate how India has “accommodated an 
abstract notion of the absolute,” and then 
quotes the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad passage 
that states “this One is sure not a woman, 
nor is this One a man, and this One is 
certainly not a eunich. It is protected by 
those very bodies whichever It takes up” 
(S.U. 5.10).  
Then Rukmani, throughout her study, 
contrasts the more enthusiastic 
interpretations in favor of a yogic theism in 
the commentaries of several important 
commentators on the Yoga Sūtra with what 
she feels is a far more reserved or even 
absent theism in the content of Patañjali’s 
thought or in the aphorisms themselves. 
She goes into some detail how interpreters 
of the YS, while leaning toward a greater or 
lesser conception of theistic yoga, all of 
them are essentially engaged in an 
eisegetical reading of the text, claiming 
more of a theism in the Yoga Sūtra than 
that which is truly there in Patañjali’s 
thought. To effectively show this, Rukmani 
specifically focuses on the interpretations 
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of the word īśvara and the phrase īśvara-
praṇidhāna, and the sūtra texts that engage 
them, from different commentators, and 
then contrasts these with Patañjali’s 
employment of them in his text showing 
their relatively less important place in 
relation to the essential aim of the yogic 
process or practice. 
Gerald Larson, in his study entitled, 
“Yoga’s ‘A-Theistic’-Theism: A New Way of 
Thinking about God,” argues that classical 
Yoga philosophy, or more specifically, 
Patañjali’s conception of God or theism is 
unique, unlike anything developed in 
Indian or Western thinking on the subject. 
Larson seems to be claiming that Indian 
forms of theism are equally foreign to 
Yoga’s theism as those theisms of the West. 
(3) To this statement I would say that the 
Yoga notion of God contrasts Western 
theological formulations more than Indian 
ones. Indeed, Larson himself, in his study, 
draws far more from the Indian 
philosophers and commentators to 
Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra and not from 
Western theologians and philosophers to 
interpret or understand this peculiar God 
formulation. It makes perfect sense that 
Larson would draw primarily from the 
Indic traditions, since it is out its rich 
theological soil that the Yoga conception of 
God grows. Indeed, Rukmani herself 
constantly dips into the background texts, 
such as the Vedas and the Upanishads, to 
further illuminate and support her points 
in examining commentators’ positions in 
relation to Patañjali’s words. Moreover, 
Rukmani attests to the theistic leanings in 
Vyāsa’s commentary to the Yoga Sūtra, and 
especially that of the bhakti interpretations 
of Vijñānabhikṣu. 
Following Larson’s review of the key 
sūtra texts that focus on a theism, texts 
1.23-29, he launches into four types of 
deconstructive analyses in order to show us 
what should not be involved or engaged in 
the theism of Yoga. This deconstructive 
analysis is the dominant focus of his study. 
He claims that Yoga theism must undergo a 
process of (1) de-personalization, (2) de-
anthropomorphization, (3) de-
mythologization, and (4) de-
conceptualization. I feel that Larson’s 
deconstructionistic approach in his paper is 
valuable, because it paves the way for a 
deeper consideration and view of what 
theism truly has been as well as what it 
could develop into being, with the greatest 
caution against imposing any 
preconceptions or prejudices derived from 
the conditioned ways we may view the 
notion of God as influenced by the powerful 
Western and Hindu religious or sectarian 
sources.  
Larson suggests that “the manner in 
which classical Yoga philosophy deals with 
the notion of God may offer some 
interesting perspectives for re-thinking the 
problem of God.” While Larson points out 
that Patañjali “accepts some sort of notion 
about God,” he first wants to deconstruct 
the God of Yoga to pave the way for a solid 
re-construction of a genuine theism. Larson 
wants this God to be “objectless” and 
resorts to conceptions such as “perfect 
sattva” and “eternal excellence” and “the 
pinnacle of omniscience” from Patañjali’s 
thought (YS 1.25). These abstract notions of 
God that Larson draws from the Sūtras may 
leave us with something that may be, I am 
suggesting, somewhat more abstract and 
incomplete than what Patañjali himself 
offers us in his text. It is interesting that, 
for the most part, both Rukmani and Larson 
concentrate on texts 1.23-29 to understand 
the abstract theism of Yoga, and they do so 
with great finesse and solid criticism. But I 
believe that Patañjali offers us more, which 
I will say more about below.   
Andrea R. Jain’s study, “The 
Malleability of Yoga: A Response to 
Christian and Hindu Opponents of the 
Popularization of Yoga,” in a sense 
responds to Larson’s call to re-construct or 
perhaps simply to construct anew the Yoga 
notion of God. Jain calls our attention to 
the many ways, historically, Yoga has 
functioned and been applied in the lives of 
its practitioners, and this type of diversity 
was certainly exemplified by the early 
commentators of the Sūtra, as Rukmani 
amply shows. After all, is that not what a 
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sūtra is for: the teacher’s vision of its 
timeless wisdom and the application of its 
teachings according to this vision?  
Jain brings out the contemporary 
problem of conservative Christians in the 
West who cannot accept Yoga as something 
to be added to their faith, and conservative 
Hindus do not accept that Yoga is 
something that can be removed from their 
faith. Each of them is against the 
popularization of Yoga for their own 
reasons. Jain goes to some trouble to show 
the diversity within Yoga practices as far 
back as ancient times, even contrasting the 
Yoga of the Bhagavad Gītā and the Yoga of 
the Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali. There is no 
“unchanging essence” of Yoga, Jain asserts, 
and there is now and always has been a 
plurality of Yoga.  
Jain’s study points us to what has 
always been true of religion in general, or 
for that matter, for art as well. It is a matter 
of context. It is a matter of how and 
whether something is framed for it to be 
art, or how it is to be seen as meaningful to 
persons for it to be religious. It has always 
been something so very personal. For 
example, because I may see someone in a 
restaurant drinking wine and eating bread 
does not necessarily mean they are 
performing the ritual of the Eucharist! A 
more likely place would be the sacred 
context or framing, as it were, of a church. 
And since such a meal is observed as having 
taken place at a restaurant, I can safely 
assume that no such ritual was being 
performed in that instance.  
However, who’s to say that this patron 
of the restaurant did not consider that the 
wine he was drinking was not the blood of 
Christ? And that the bread he was eating 
was not the body of Christ? I would have to 
ask him or her. And further, do I have a 
right to tell this person how he or she must 
regard the wine and the bread? Should I be 
able to tell this person that he or she has no 
right to partake of wine and bread outside 
of a church and without priestly ritual? 
How Yoga practice is “framed” in the mind 
and heart of the practitioner is what counts, 
and not others’ assessments or judgments 
of that practice. Invariably, what is 
efficacious in Yoga depends upon the 
reality of the practitioner’s situation, that 
is, the intent, the desire, and the realized 
achievement of the practitioner. Whether it 
be the convenient physical or health 
benefits of Yoga that one is after or the 
loftiest depths of meditation that reveal 
one’s greatest truth and a vision of ultimate 
reality, this is a matter of personal decision 
and realization no matter what the social 
considerations, pressures or expectations 
may be. 
The concept of theism in Patañjali’s 
Yoga is not only abstract, as has been 
emphasized by both Rukmani and Larson, 
but it is flexible (no pun intended). Jain’s 
study reminds us of Yoga’s inherent 
historical elasticity, or its ability to adapt to 
different religions, different cultures, at 
different times. The Vedas recognized Yoga 
practice, the religion of the Upanishads 
absorbed it, Buddhism and Jainism and 
even Taoism eventually utilized it, and so it 
should be no surprise that there are now 
Jews, Christians, and even Muslims 
engaging Yoga to enhance the practice of 
their faiths. And along with this elasticity 
of Yoga comes all the objections to its 
adaptations by persons within these faiths 
who find it inauthentic or wrong for 
whatever reason. But the important point I 
wish to make here is that Yoga’s theism is 
certainly not threatening, nor is it 
doctrinally driven such that Yoga would 
somehow require one to believe in certain 
things in order to authentically take up the 
physical practice of Yoga. It is not as if the 
tradition of Yoga is endlessly mutable, and 
we certainly do speak of change but not 
without some sense of the continuity of 
tradition. Thus Yoga theism is fluid and 
Yoga practice is flexible, and these 
characteristics may account for its easy 
entrance into various religio-cultural 
contexts at different points in history. 
Jain’s insistence that there has never 
been an “unchanging essence” of Yoga 
might be slightly extreme. Is she saying 
that there is nothing consistently central to 
Yoga practice and thought? Is Yoga so 
4
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies, Vol. 25 [2012], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol25/iss1/7
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1513
Toward a Fusion of Theological Horizons 29 
elastic and adaptable that Yoga can be 
anything anyone wants it to be without 
ever acknowledging something at its core? 
Is it not a truism almost to the point, in a 
sort of buddhistic sense, that nothing has 
an essence and everything forever 
changes? I question this, because I think 
this can be taken too far. In the Bhagavad 
Gītā, Krishna states, “by the powerful effect 
of time, this yoga was lost . . . in the world” 
(BG 4.2). So perhaps there is a point at 
which Yoga can lose something of its 
essential characteristics, practices, or 
something at the core of its traditional 
vision, even as flexible and as adaptable as 
Yoga has been and still is.  
Here, I believe, we might pause for a 
moment, and carefully consider the 
meaning of the words truth and reality and 
the important difference between them. Let 
us return to Rukmani’s engagement of her 
translation of the statement from the Rig 
Veda cited above. The Sanskrit for this 
passage is the following: ekaṁ sad viprā 
bahudhā vadanti (RV 1.164.46). My 
translation, which includes the way in 
which each original word is applied, seeks a 
theologically sensitive and precise 
rendition, as the following: “There is one 
(ekam) reality (sat) about which vibrant 
persons (viprā) in various ways (bahudhā) 
speak (vadanti).” The juxtaposition of “the 
one reality” with “the various ways to 
speak about it” is itself, I would proffer, a 
definition of “truth.” When humans, or 
“vibrant persons,” desire to grasp that 
which is ungraspable, they paradoxcially 
can experience a genuine grasping of the 
ungraspable, one reality that is attained in 
Yoga, and that very grasping itself is what I 
would designate as a person’s “truth.” Thus 
supreme reality is one, but the truths that 
arise from this grasping of it are many, even 
unlimited. And the Yoga Sūtra explains 
this: the one who grasps supreme being 
(gṛhītṛ), the grasping of supreme being 
(grahaṇa), and that which is grasped of 
supreme being (grāhya), come together in 
the samāpatti (YS 1.41) of samādhi, 
illuminating the components involved in 
the revelation of truth.  
Because we do not have in English a 
noun for the adjective true, it is natural that 
we would resort to the word truth to fill 
that role. However, in Sanskrit, the word 
sat and the word satya are more strictly 
translated as “the true” and “the truth” 
respectively. The word sat in the 
theological context really connotes 
ultimate reality, and since the word 
grammatically is a present participle of its 
root “as”, which is the verb “to be,” the 
phrase “supreme being” seems most 
appropriate.  
The word sat also in the context of the 
three auspicious utterances as presented in 
the Bhagavad Gītā, oṁ tat sat, also is further 
revealing. The juxtaposition of the 
utterance tat with the utterance sat 
immediately delivers a relationship 
between the specificity of being with the 
fullness of being, respectively. The fluid 
relationship between tat and sat is 
expressed and indicated by the inclusion of 
the praṇava oṁkāra in this formula. In Indic 
traditions, one cannot have the tat without 
the sat, and one cannot have the sat without 
the tat, and neither is desirable without the 
fluid movement between the two as oṁ. 
While the abstract theos of the tat would be 
stretching the domain of theism to include 
it, we need to stretch it even further to 
include the sat, because there is not the one 
without the other. Moreover, the 
dialectical movement between the two, 
what I have referred to here as “fluidity” as 
it were, must be incorporated in an 
understanding of Indian theism.  
Let us examine even further the oṁ-tat-
sat dialectic. The Upanishads in general is 
preoccupied with this fluid movement 
between the expressions of Brahman as sat, 
as the nondescriptive, nonpersonal more 
abstract theism in the fullness of supreme 
being, and the tat, as the descriptive, more 
circumscribed more personal theism in the 
fullness and yet specificity of a supreme 
being. One of the well-known invocations 
for several Upanishads expresses the 
fullness of being, in other words Brahman, 
in the use of the word pūrṇam: “Fullness is 
there (pūrṇam adaḥ). Fullness is here 
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(pūrṇam idam). From Fullness (pūrṇāt), 
Fullness comes (pūrṇam udacyate). From 
Fullness (pūrṇasya), when Fullness is taken 
(pūrṇam ādāya), Fullness (pūrṇam), even so, 
completely remains (evāvaśiṣyate).” These 
invocational words can speak about 
Fullness, or Brahman, as being “here” or 
“there”. This is expressive of the tat or a 
recognition of what is fundamentally a 
theistic distinction. However, in presenting 
Fullness, the invocation also describes 
something from which an endless and 
absolute source of discrete Fullnesses are 
derivative without diminishing the original 
completeness or wholeness of Fullness, 
expressive of the sat. When invoking or 
speaking of the one, one is also invoking or 
speaking of the other, and vice versa, and 
thus the inextricable fluidity and 
interdependency between the two.  
There is a glaring omission in both 
Rukmani’s and Larson’s studies that must 
be pointed out here. Neither acknowledges 
Patañjali’s famous phrase iṣṭa-devatā in the 
Yoga Sūtra. Patañjali recognizes the way 
the practitioner of Yoga may choose a 
beloved divinity as a consequence of deep 
study: “From deep study and recitation of 
sacred texts to oneself, svādhyāya, one’s 
most desired divinity is experienced fully 
within Yoga” (svādhyāyād iṣṭa-devatā-
samprayogaḥ, YS 2.44). The key phrase here 
is iṣṭa-devatā. The word iṣṭa can be 
translated as “loved,” “desired,” or 
“chosen.” Here, again, we see Yoga’s 
elasticity, its flexibility, and its inclusivity. 
Patañjali is saying that out of the practive 
of svādhyāya, which can include many 
practices beyond the deep study of sacred 
texts, such as japa meditation, etc., comes 
the desire to connect with the divinity, in a 
particular form or image of the divine. This 
open-endedness is characteristic of Yoga.  
This guidance for the practitioner to 
focus on a “desired [form of the] divine” is 
in sharp contrast to that of the abrahamic 
traditions, which have, as a backdrop, the 
prohibition against imaging the divine. In 
the Decalogue of the Hebrew Bible, we 
easily recall the commandment, “You shall 
not make for yourself an idol . . . in the 
form of anything . . . for I the Lord your God 
am a jealous God . . .” (Exodus 20:4-5, NRSV). 
Thus it is unthinkable to create three 
dimensional sacred images, artistic images 
of any kind, or even ideational images or 
forms of the divine. But in India, the 
commandment would be quite the 
opposite: “You shall make for yourself an 
image that you most love and desire, in the 
form of anything, for I am your infinite God, 
and endless are my forms (ananta-rūpa).”  
 The word devatā is found only once in 
this text, but that it was engaged at all and 
how it is engaged is significant. Both 
Rukmani and Larson, in their own ways, 
insist that the word īśvara is ultimately 
synonymous with brahman (which, 
incidentally, is a term appearing not even 
once in the Yoga Sūtra). But here we must 
also understand īśvara as having a 
relationship with devatā, which is strongly 
theistic language. Taking the word devatā 
into consideration only strengthens the 
picture of theism in the Yoga Sūtra, and 
perhaps invites us to probe further into the 
text’s more subtle expressions of theism 
than what we might expect. Even though I 
could imagine how Rukmani, at this point, 
might give iṣṭa-devatā less importance 
because it appears in the second sādhana-
pāda intended for the madhyama-yogin 
(intermediate practitioner), I would insist 
that the appearance of this phrase begs to 
be considered for interpreting the critical 
phrase īśvara-praṇidhāna, which first 
appears in the samādhi-pāda, the portion of 
the Yoga Sūtra describing the experience of 
the uttama-yogin (the advanced 
practitioner).  
Furthering an earlier discussion above, 
devatā is synonymous with truth. A person’s 
truth is what is ultimately loved, revered, 
honored, and framed, as it were, as the 
highest reality. It is that person’s tat in 
relation to the sat. Or put in a simple 
equation, sat divided (or “grasped”) by tat 
equals that person’s satya or devatā. Such a 
vision of devatā must be understood as 
īśvara, which we might understand as being 
brahman and devatā, both, no doubt a fluid 
meaning in the way the term moves 
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between the former and the latter. If we 
examine the word īśvara etymologically, we 
derive a definition of the term that reveals 
these two fluid, albeit, components of a 
specific type of theism. The word breaks 
down as the two separate words, īśa and 
vara. The word īśa can mean “governer,” 
“ruler,” or “lord,” and the word vara can 
mean “environing,” “enclosing,” “space,” 
or “circumference.” The latter word can 
have many different meanings, but these 
are closest to the word’s root means from 
vṛ. While the force of the word brahman 
leans more toward the state of oneness and 
ultimacy, and while devatā leans more 
toward a theos, we might understand that 
īśvara is the “governer of the circumference 
(that constitutes ultimate reality).” The 
word implies the components of a geometic 
configuration: the circumcenter (īśa) and 
the circumference (vara), the former 
representing devatā and the latter 
representing brahman.  
  In four of the five total instances in 
which the word īśvara appears in the first 
two pādas of the Yoga Sūtra (YS 1.23, 24; 2.1, 
32, and 45), it is coupled with the word 
praṇidhāna, another word that deserves 
attention. The word is often translated as 
“dedication,” “devotion,” or “submission.” 
The Monier-Williams Sanskrit dictionary 
provides two better glosses for the word 
that, for some reason, is rarely found in 
translations of the Yoga Sūtra: “profound 
religious meditation” and “abstract 
contemplation.” But an etymological, albeit 
a rather protracted, definition of the word 
spells these out a little further as, “moving 
(pra-) deeply (-ni-) into or from the 
receptacle or seat (-dhāna) [of the heart].” 
The word dhāna relates to what the 
Upanishads call “the space within the 
heart,” in which the yogin will discover the 
divine. The fifth and final appearance of 
the word coupled with īśvara is found in YS 
2.45: “The perfection of samādhi comes 
from the profound religious meditation on 
īśvara” (samādhi-siddhir īśvara-praṇidhānāt). 
Although profound meditation on the 
divine may be found as a practice in one of 
the lower limbs of the eight-limbed path, 
namely the fifth practice of niyama, it is 
very clear from the samādhi-pāda and from 
this last instance of īśvara-praṇidhāna that it 
is a practice that is intimately involved at 
the highest level or perfection of samādhi, 
the goal of all Yoga.  
Yoga, then, involves the continuous 
uninterrupted movement of consciousness 
that reaches deeply into the heart where 
the yogin eventually discovers īśvara, who 
is the divine puruṣa (who can be equated 
with the devatā) and the absolute brahman. 
Therefore, as I have been demonstrating, 
the openness and fluidity of the Yoga 
theism in the Yoga Sūtra allows for Larson’s 
deconstructive advaitic nontheism, while it 
also accomodates the constructivist theism 
that one might expect to see from a bhakti 
theology. From my point of view, the Yoga 
Sūtra, however, presents more of a solid, 
albeit raw theism, far outweighing a purely 
abstract, advaitic non-theism.  
Let us take Yoga theism even further. A 
constructivist view of the Yoga Sūtra could 
easily lead one to observe some hint at 
what we would call grace coming from the 
divine. Rukmani claims that there is no 
such divine grace as one would find within 
Christian traditions. But I believe that Yoga 
has its own form of grace expressed by the 
term samāpatti, and as described in the text 
in which the term is defined:  
 
When the turning has ceased,  
when that which is inborn shines forth 
like that of a jewel in the one who 
grasps,  
in the grasping and in that which 
is to be grasped, one stands so near 
that one attains a state in which  
[a divine] ointment has been absorbed-
--- 
this is Samāpatti, ‘coalescence’  
[of subject and object in meditation]. 
  (YS 1.41) 
 
In this very literal translation, samāpatti 
is the “falling into a state or condition” 
(Monier-Williams Sanskrit Dictionary) or 
what “happens” to the meditating yogin. 
The consciousness of the meditator is 
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compared to a jewel that is so pure, so 
polished that it can shine forth due to its 
capacity to catch the light that shines down 
upon it. The implied element of light in the 
aphorism’s first metaphor of the shining 
jewel is reinforced by the explicit and 
tangible substance of an ointment that is 
put forth in the second metaphor of the 
text: that state of consciousness in the 
meditator that absorbs the ointment from 
the object on which he or she is meditating. 
This light, this ointment, which comes from 
a divine object in samāpatti, is tantamount 
to the grace in Yoga. I don’t think it is any 
mistake that one of the most commonly 
used words for “grace,” namely anugraha, 
or that which “follows the grasping” of 
truth, is derived from the same root as 
grahītṛ (“the one who grasps”), grahaṇa 
(“the grasping”), and grāhya (“that which is 
to be grasped”), the three elements that 
become united in Yoga when attaining a 
state of grace in samāpatti. 
It is not within the scope of this study 
to conduct a thorough vetting of the subtle 
but certainly present, albeit raw, theistic 
nuances of the Yoga Sūtra. The task that 
faces us when confronted with the 
challenge of bringing out any comparative 
connections and interreligious similarities 
or commonalities in the theisms of both the 
Christian and Yoga traditions is a wide 
enough definition of theism. If we are going 
to ask if there is a theism in the Yoga Sūtra, 
if there is a God of Yoga, then it behooves 
us to define the term now more 
comprehensively and more thoroughly that 
may prove to expand and deepen the 
domain of theism precisely because we 
have a comparative purpose. It is the work 
of a theologist, as I have defined its unique 
role above, to move such terms into the 
comparative arena that casts a wider 
theological net, accounting for any data 
that would contribute to an understanding 
of this category.  
A comparative analysis of Christian 
theism and the theism of Yoga might utilize 
the ten dimensions I outline below. These 
ten dimensions are my attempt to give a 
comprehensive definition of theism 
because I have found other definitions of 
the term inadequate for comparative 
purposes. Such definitions were generally 
more or less derivative of Greek, Jewish and 
Christian theological traditions, producing 
too narrow a definition.  
The idea of theism is expounded upon 
or demonstrated in philosophical discourse, 
or religious revelation, or theological 
conceptualization, or a personal or shared 
understanding, expression, or vision of 
“the ultimate reality” that possesses any 
combination or all of the following ten 
dimensions: 
 
(1) A discrete, unified, perfect and 
divine supreme being, the eternal 
self-existent primordial entity, who 
is often denoted by the word God;  
 
(2) Who is, on some level, 
apprehended as distinctly personal, 
presented in descriptive or 
nondescriptive terms, and who is 
perceived as having either the 
intimate and affectionate and/or 
powerful and grand personified or 
nonpersonified unlimited forms;  
 
(3) Who may reveal a singular, dual, 
or multiple number of divine 
manifestations;  
 
(4) Who may receive gender 
attributions of feminine, masculine, 
both or neither, androgynous or 
neuter designations;  
 
(5) Who is understood as 
distinguishable from and yet a part 
of the totality of being;  
 
(6) Who has a relationship with the 
whole of reality as its source, as its 
creator, or as its sustainer;  
 
(7) Who, on some level, also 
contains and fully embraces the 
totality of being of which such a 
divine being is the very center and 
foundation;  
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(8) Whose relationship to the 
totality of being allows such a 
divine being to be actively and 
continuously present in the world 
in various ways, which may include 
acts of grace, divine intervensions, 
and special epiphanies;  
 
(9) Who may appear to be limited in 
appearance when manifesting in an 
apparently limited form, who not 
only remains the unlimited divine 
being, but whose specially 
manifested form discloses unique 
aspects of supreme unlimited being 
for purposes of providentially 
guiding human beings because of 
pure grace;  
 
(10) And with whom specifically 
human beings among all other 
beings can connect directly or 
indirectly in various ways 
according to the naturally 
occurring or acquired capacity of 
human receptivity to the divine 
supreme being. 
 
Perhaps after this attempt to bring out 
ten dimensions of it, theism could be 
contrasted to related terms or can be found 
partially incorporating them, terms such as 
pantheism, deism, panentheism, 
polytheism, monism, atheism, etc. My point 
in presenting these ten dimensions of 
theism here is to suggest that this could be 
used as a starting point for comparative 
analysis of the theism between the two 
traditions.  
Larson himself says that “God is not 
captured by religion. God cannot be 
conceptualized by philosophy.” And to this 
I respond in agreement while insisting that 
there is therefore a special domain for 
theology. Larson dramatically ends his 
study with Wittgenstein’s words warning 
us that ultimately language is limiting and 
words are inadequate for describing such 
ineffible levels of reality, and that we must 
resort to silence, schweigen, the German 
word, ironically, from which my last name 
is derived. Yet here my attempt has been to 
move toward anything but silence! Rather, I 
wish to move toward a fusion of theological 
horizons, to revise a borrowed phrase from 
Hans-Georg Gadamer. I wish to move 
toward more ways, more terms, expanded 
definitions, greater expressions for the 
ways to explore and understand the endless 
depths of theism without fear of 
committing it to a closed system or 
eclipsing its power, without fear of 
reductionisms or reifications, in the hopes 
that we can discover, first within and then 
between religious traditions, some shared 
theological moment that will open up even 
greater revelations among and between the 
thirsting human hearts of this world.  
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